论文标题
安全颁发，机构投资者和交易所
Security Issuance, Institutional Investors and Quid Pro Quo
论文作者
论文摘要
通过中介机构发行证券，应遵守代理问题和信息摩擦。我们使用SPAC数据检查了这些效果。我们确定参与与降低清算风险，更高的回报和降低赎回率有关的``溢价''投资者，与信息租金和代理机构摩擦一致。相比之下，``非高级''投资者从事非机构的关系关系。具体而言，他们从中介（QUID）获得高收益，以换取默契协议，以参与较弱的未来交易（QUO）。这些关系是发行人和中介机构的保险，使更多的发行人能够进入市场。
Securities issuance through intermediaries is subject to agency problems and informational frictions. We examine these effects using SPAC data. We identify ``premium'' investors whose participation is linked to lower liquidation risk, higher returns, and lower redemption rates, consistent with both informational rents and agency frictions. In contrast, ``non-premium'' investors engage in non-agency quid pro quo relationships. Specifically, they receive high returns from an intermediary (quid) in exchange for a tacit agreement to participate in weaker future deals (quo). These relationships serve as insurance for issuers and intermediaries, enabling more issuers to access markets.
