论文标题
拜占庭多个访问渠道 - 第一部分：可靠的通信
Byzantine Multiple Access Channels -- Part I: Reliable Communication
论文作者
论文摘要
我们通过多个访问渠道（MAC）研究沟通，用户可能是对抗性的。接收器不知道对抗用户的身份（如果有）。当所有用户都是非对抗性的时，我们希望他们的消息可靠地解码。当用户行为对抗时，我们要求可靠地解码诚实的用户的消息。对抗用户可以通过将任何输入发送到渠道而不是遵循协议来安装攻击。事实证明，$ 2 $ - 用户MAC容量区域从任意变化的渠道（AVC）容量遵循。对于$ 3 $ - 用户Mac，其中最多可能是一个恶意的Mac，我们表征了确定性代码和随机代码的容量区域（每个用户都与接收器共享一个独立的随机秘密密钥）。然后将这些结果概括为$ k $ - 用户Mac，对手可以在给定子集集合中控制所有用户。
We study communication over a Multiple Access Channel (MAC) where users can possibly be adversarial. The receiver is unaware of the identity of the adversarial users (if any). When all users are non-adversarial, we want their messages to be decoded reliably. When a user behaves adversarially, we require that the honest users' messages be decoded reliably. An adversarial user can mount an attack by sending any input into the channel rather than following the protocol. It turns out that the $2$-user MAC capacity region follows from the point-to-point Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) capacity. For the $3$-user MAC in which at most one user may be malicious, we characterize the capacity region for deterministic codes and randomized codes (where each user shares an independent random secret key with the receiver). These results are then generalized for the $k$-user MAC where the adversary may control all users in one out of a collection of given subsets.
