论文标题
网络安全性建筑弹性 - 一种人工实验室方法
Building Resilience in Cybersecurity -- An Artificial Lab Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
基于经典的传染模型，我们引入了一个人工网络实验室：复杂网络系统的数字双胞胎，其中可能实施和测试了可能的网络弹性措施。在数值案例研究中，我们使用实验室确定了两类措施来控制系统性的网络风险：基于安全性和拓扑的干预措施。我们讨论了我们的发现对当前在保险和法规实践中采用的现实网络安全措施的含义，或者在讨论未来的网络风险控制中。为此，我们简要概述了当前的网络安全法规，并强调保险公司作为私人监管机构的作用。此外，从保险的角度来看，我们提供了第一次尝试设计系统性网络风险义务并衡量个人保单持有人的系统性风险贡献。
Based on classical contagion models we introduce an artificial cyber lab: the digital twin of a complex cyber system in which possible cyber resilience measures may be implemented and tested. Using the lab, in numerical case studies, we identify two classes of measures to control systemic cyber risks: security- and topology-based interventions. We discuss the implications of our findings on selected real-world cybersecurity measures currently applied in the insurance and regulation practice or under discussion for future cyber risk control. To this end, we provide a brief overview of the current cybersecurity regulation and emphasize the role of insurance companies as private regulators. Moreover, from an insurance point of view, we provide first attempts to design systemic cyber risk obligations and to measure the systemic risk contribution of individual policyholders.
