论文标题
攻击(和防御)海上雷达系统
Attacking (and defending) the Maritime Radar System
论文作者
论文摘要
雷达设备的操作是导航员用来收集有关其周围环境的情境意识的关键设施之一。随着对始终运行的物流和更严格的运输计划的需求,运营商越来越依赖计算机仪器及其指示。结果,现代船只已成为一个复杂的网络物理系统,在该系统中,传感器和计算机不断进行交流和协调。在这项工作中,我们讨论了与雷达系统有关的新颖威胁,这是船上最安全敏感的组件之一。详细介绍,我们首先讨论了一些新的攻击,能够损害雷达系统上显示的数据的完整性,并可能对机组人员的情境意识甚至安全本身产生灾难性的影响。然后,我们提出了一个旨在突出雷达视频提要中异常的检测系统,不需要对目标船舶配置进行修改。最后,我们通过在模拟环境内部执行攻击来刺激检测系统。实验结果清楚地表明,攻击是可行的,相当容易执行的,并且难以检测。此外,他们证明了提出的检测技术是有效的。
Operation of radar equipment is one of the key facilities used by navigators to gather situational awareness about their surroundings. With an ever increasing need for always-running logistics and tighter shipping schedules, operators are relying more and more on computerized instruments and their indications. As a result, modern ships have become a complex cyber-physical system in which sensors and computers constantly communicate and coordinate. In this work, we discuss novel threats related to the radar system, which is one of the most security-sensitive component on a ship. In detail, we first discuss some new attacks capable of compromising the integrity of data displayed on a radar system, with potentially catastrophic impacts on the crew' situational awareness or even safety itself. Then, we present a detection system aimed at highlighting anomalies in the radar video feed, requiring no modifications to the target ship configuration. Finally, we stimulate our detection system by performing the attacks inside of a simulated environment. The experimental results clearly indicate that the attacks are feasible, rather easy to carry out, and hard-to-detect. Moreover, they prove that the proposed detection technique is effective.