论文标题
一类争吵的一般框架：吵架的悖论重新审视
A General Framework for a Class of Quarrels: The Quarrelling Paradox Revisited
论文作者
论文摘要
如果投票权的衡量标准将更大的投票权分配给玩家，因为它不再有效与他人合作，那么该措施将显示争吵的悖论并违反了争吵。我们提供了正式的标准来判断给定的争吵概念是否是（a）合理的，并且（b）适合作为合理争吵的基础。为了实现这一目标，我们对一个一般框架进行形式化，以区分三个程度的争吵（弱，强，灾难性），对称性与不对称争吵，以及倒数吵架与非亲密吵架，从而产生了两个概念的概念和概念，从而产生了十二个概念的概念，这些概念和概念均可及其范围。我们认为，基于这些概念的吵架假设的两个现有表述是不合理的。相比之下，我们证明，由我们的框架确定的对称的，弱的争吵概念（无论是否倒数）都适合作为合理争吵的基础。此外，经典的Shapley-Shubik索引和Penrose-Banzhaf测量都可以根据对称的弱争吵来满足争吵。
If a measure of voting power assigns greater voting power to a player because it no longer effectively cooperates with another, then the measure displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. We provide formal criteria by which to judge whether a given conception of quarrelling is (a) reasonable and (b) fit to serve as the basis for a reasonable quarrel postulate. To achieve this, we formalize a general framework distinguishing between three degrees of quarrelling (weak, strong, cataclysmic), symmetric vs. asymmetrical quarrels, and reciprocal vs. non-reciprocal quarrels, and which thereby yields twelve conceptions of quarrelling, which encompasses the two conceptions proposed by Felsenthal and Machover and by Laruelle and Valenciano, respectively. We argue that the two existing formulations of the quarrel postulate based on these conceptions are unreasonable. In contrast, we prove that the symmetric, weak conception of quarrelling identified by our framework -- whether reciprocal or not -- is fit to serve as the basis for a reasonable quarrel postulate. Furthermore, the classic Shapley-Shubik index and Penrose-Banzhaf measure both satisfy the quarrel postulate based on a symmetric weak quarrel.
