论文标题
破坏DOS攻击者
Bankrupting DoS Attackers
论文作者
论文摘要
我们可以比服务器和诚实的客户提供拒绝服务攻击者支付的费用吗？考虑一个模型，服务器看到诚实客户或对手发送的作业流。该服务器设定了借助估算器为每项工作提供服务的价格，该估计器提供了有关先前发生的好工作分布的近似统计信息。 我们在不同的同步模型下描述和分析服务器的定价算法，总成本由估算器的准确性参数化。鉴于一个相当准确的估计器，随着攻击者的成本增长，该算法的成本比攻击者的成本更慢。此外，我们证明了一个下限，表明当估计器在恒定因子内准确时，我们的定价算法会产生渐近的结果。
Can we make a denial-of-service attacker pay more than the server and honest clients? Consider a model where a server sees a stream of jobs sent by either honest clients or an adversary. The server sets a price for servicing each job with the aid of an estimator, which provides approximate statistical information about the distribution of previously occurring good jobs. We describe and analyze pricing algorithms for the server under different models of synchrony, with total cost parameterized by the accuracy of the estimator. Given a reasonably accurate estimator, the algorithm's cost provably grows more slowly than the attacker's cost, as the attacker's cost grows large. Additionally, we prove a lower bound, showing that our pricing algorithm yields asymptotically tight results when the estimator is accurate within constant factors.
