论文标题
停车问题：游戏理论解决方案
The Parking Problem: A Game-Theoretic Solution
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们通过利用用于多代理系统的战略性方法来提出一种用于停车问题的游戏理论解决方案。确切地说，汽车是由代理商在多玩家游戏设置中互动的代理商建模的，其目的是获得一个免费的老虎机停车位，满足自己的约束。然后将整体分配作为NASH平衡解决方案。我们提出了一种在二次时期工作的算法（及其在工具中的实现）。我们通过在大型医院停车位上运行工具来证明我们方法的好处。
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic solution to the parking problem, by exploiting a strategic-reasoning approach for multi-agent systems. Precisely, cars are modeled by agents interacting among them in a multi-player game setting, whose aim is to get a free slot parking-place satisfying their own constraints. The overall assignment is then given as a Nash equilibrium solution. We come up with an algorithm (and its implementation in a tool) that works in quadratic time. We give evidence of the benefits of our approach by running our tool on a large hospital parking space.
