论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
You get PADDING, everybody gets PADDING! You get privacy? Evaluating practical QUIC website fingerprinting protections for the masses
论文作者
论文摘要
网站指纹识别（WF）是对用户网络隐私的知识威胁。诸如QUIC之类的新互联网标准包括填充以支持针对WF的防御能力。先前的工作仅分析用户在VPN落后时防御的有效性。但是，这并不是大多数用户浏览互联网的方式。在本文中，当用户直接浏览网络时，我们对针对WF的基于Quic-padding的防御措施进行了全面评估。我们确认以前的说法是，网络层填充不能为能够观察所有交通轨迹的强大对手提供良好的保护。我们进一步证明，这种填充即使针对对对手的交通可见性和处理能力的限制也是无效的。在应用程序层，我们表明必须由第一和第三方部署防御能力，并且他们只能在有限的情况下阻止流量分析。我们确定了部署有效的WF防御措施的挑战，并提供了解决方案的建议。
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a well-know threat to users' web privacy. New internet standards, such as QUIC, include padding to support defenses against WF. Previous work only analyzes the effectiveness of defenses when users are behind a VPN. Yet, this is not how most users browse the Internet. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of QUIC-padding-based defenses against WF when users directly browse the web. We confirm previous claims that network-layer padding cannot provide good protection against powerful adversaries capable of observing all traffic traces. We further demonstrate that such padding is ineffective even against adversaries with constraints on traffic visibility and processing power. At the application layer, we show that defenses need to be deployed by both first and third parties, and that they can only thwart traffic analysis in limited situations. We identify challenges to deploy effective WF defenses and provide recommendations to address them.
