论文标题
GNSS攻击检测的高精度硬件振荡器集合
High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection
论文作者
论文摘要
大量重要应用程序依赖于全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）的精确时间和定位。攻击者决定GNSS接收器位置和时间解决方案是一个重大风险，尤其是由于GNSS系统的固有脆弱性。对于大量接收者来说，第一道防线是依靠通过启用GNSS平台的丰富连接获得的其他信息。网络时间可用于直接验证GNSS接收器时间；但这取决于网络可用性。为了允许攻击检测，即使网络断开延长，我们也会提出一种基于参考时钟机上集合的方法。这使得接收器可以检测影响GNSS时间解决方案的复杂攻击，而与特定的攻击方法无关。用芯片尺度烤箱补偿振荡器（CS-OCXO）获得的结果很有希望，并证明了参考时钟的嵌入式集合的潜力，检测攻击导致接收器时间偏移的修改低至0.3US，与相关文献相比，检测延迟的一半。
A wide gamut of important applications rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise time and positioning. Attackers dictating the GNSS receiver position and time solution are a significant risk, especially due to the inherent vulnerability of GNSS systems. A first line of defense, for a large number of receivers, is to rely on additional information obtained through the rich connectivity of GNSS enabled platforms. Network time can be used for direct validation of the GNSS receiver time; but this depends on network availability. To allow attack detection even when there are prolonged network disconnections, we present a method based on on-board ensemble of reference clocks. This allows the receiver to detect sophisticated attacks affecting the GNSS time solution, independently of the specific attack methodology. Results obtained with Chip-Scale Oven Compensated Oscillators (CS-OCXO) are promising and demonstrate the potential of embedded ensembles of reference clocks, detecting attacks causing modifications of the receiver time offset as low as 0.3us, with half the detection latency compared to related literature.
