论文标题
贝叶斯先生和经典：建议的解释
Mr. Bayes and the classics: a suggested interpretation
论文作者
论文摘要
The main hypothesis about Thomas Bayes's intentions to write his famous Essay on probability is that he wanted to refute the arguments of David Hume against the reliability of the occurrence of miracles, published in 1748. In this paper we argue that it was not Bayes's intention to rebut Hume but that his interest on the "inverse problem" came about as result of his study of the second edition of Abraham De Moivre's book, The Doctrine of机会于1738年出版。 贝叶斯突破的可能交流可能使de Moivre烦恼，导致在1756年出版的第三版De Moivre的书中为贝叶斯写的回应。除其他方面，回应声称，De Moivre是第一个解决上述反问题的回应。从这个角度来看，理查德·普莱斯（Richard Price）的信（作为贝叶斯论文的序言）写了一种新的解释，也以令人满意或适当的解决方案来辩护贝叶斯英超。
The main hypothesis about Thomas Bayes's intentions to write his famous Essay on probability is that he wanted to refute the arguments of David Hume against the reliability of the occurrence of miracles, published in 1748. In this paper we argue that it was not Bayes's intention to rebut Hume but that his interest on the "inverse problem" came about as result of his study of the second edition of Abraham De Moivre's book, The Doctrine of Chances, published in 1738. A possible communication of Bayes's breakthrough might have annoyed De Moivre, leading to a response written for Bayes in the third edition of De Moivre's book, published in 1756. Among other points, the response claims that De Moivre was the first to solve the mentioned inverse problem. Under this perspective Richard Price's letter, written as preface to Bayes's essay, has a new interpretation, appearing also as a defense of Bayes premiership on a satisfactory or proper solution.
