论文标题
冲突和领导层的模式：政治上有鹰派漂移吗？
A model of conflict and leadership: Is there a hawkish drift in politics?
论文作者
论文摘要
我们分析了公民与叛乱集团之间在固定资源（例如土地）上的冲突。公民有一个当选的领导人，他提出了一个划分，以使叛乱分子的土地越低，冲突成本就越高。领导者在能力和意识形态方面有所不同，以至于领导者的能力越高，冲突成本越低，领导者越多，他的效用就越高。我们表明，冲突是由政治进程引起的，以连任动机，导致领导人选择限制土地太少以表明他们的能力。我们还表明，当办公室的租金很高时，政治平衡和第二最好的分歧。特别是，政治平衡下的政策比第二好的政策更为鹰。当意识形态和能力既不知道的情况下，我们提供了一个合理的条件，在该条件下，重新当选的可能性增加了领导者的鹰派，从而提供了解释，说明了为什么霍克什政客在选举过程中可能具有自然优势。
We analyze conflict between a citizenry and an insurgent group over a fixed resource such as land. The citizenry has an elected leader who proposes a division such that, the lower the land ceded to the insurgents, the higher the cost of conflict. Leaders differ in ability and ideology such that the higher the leader's ability, the lower the cost of conflict, and the more hawkish the leader, the higher his utility from retaining land. We show that the conflict arises from the political process with re-election motives causing leaders to choose to cede too little land to signal their ability. We also show that when the rents of office are high, the political equilibrium and the second best diverge; in particular, the policy under the political equilibrium is more hawkish compared to the second best. When both ideology and ability are unknown, we provide a plausible condition under which the probability of re-election increases in the leader's hawkishness, thereby providing an explanation for why hawkish politicians may have a natural advantage under the electoral process.
