论文标题
Trilock：IC保护具有可调的腐败性和对SAT和拆除攻击的弹性
TriLock: IC Protection with Tunable Corruptibility and Resilience to SAT and Removal Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
在过去的十年中，已经对顺序逻辑锁定进行了研究，以保护顺序电路免受反向工程的保护。但是，大多数现有的顺序逻辑锁定技术都受到越来越复杂的基于SAT的攻击的威胁，可以有效地使用SAT求解器输入查询来排除不正确的键，以及基于结构分析的删除攻击。在本文中，我们提出了Trilock，这是一种同时解决这些漏洞的顺序逻辑锁定方法。 Trilock可以实现高，可调的功能性损坏，同时仍然保证在基于SAT的攻击中向SAT求解器进行指数级查询。此外，它采用了一种状态重新编码方法来掩盖原始状态寄存器与锁定方法插入的状态寄存器之间的边界，从而使检测和删除与锁定相关的组件变得更加困难。
Sequential logic locking has been studied over the last decade as a method to protect sequential circuits from reverse engineering. However, most of the existing sequential logic locking techniques are threatened by increasingly more sophisticated SAT-based attacks, efficiently using input queries to a SAT solver to rule out incorrect keys, as well as removal attacks based on structural analysis. In this paper, we propose TriLock, a sequential logic locking method that simultaneously addresses these vulnerabilities. TriLock can achieve high, tunable functional corruptibility while still guaranteeing exponential queries to the SAT solver in a SAT-based attack. Further, it adopts a state re-encoding method to obscure the boundary between the original state registers and those inserted by the locking method, thus making it more difficult to detect and remove the locking-related components.
