论文标题
基于偏好的隐私交易
Preference-Based Privacy Trading
论文作者
论文摘要
我们通过本文提出的问题是：通过正式同意（许可）交易消费者个人信息在经济上是否可行，并作为回报提供了激励措施（货币还是其他方式）？鉴于（a）人类正在“妥协”生物并具有隐私偏好的行为假设，（b）隐私是一种不存在严格界限的好处，以及（c）数据持有人下游数据持有人在数据持续方面泄漏数据泄漏的实际不可避免的能力，该数据释放供应群体在数据释放供应方面的群体中有效/有限制性的经济范围，我们提出了有效/有限的经济性，以实现有效的经济性，以实现有效的经济性，以实现高效的效率，以实现效率的经济性。简化的卖家经纪市场上的功能投标方法。我们的方法可以保留异质的隐私保护约束（在分组的消费者，即应用程序，级别）达到某些折衷水平，同时满足了为目标行为广告目的收集客户数据的机构（例如广告组织）的信息需求（例如，通过经纪人）。
The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives (monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the behavioral assumption that humans are `compromising' beings and have privacy preferences, (b) privacy as a good not having strict boundaries, and (c) the practical inevitability of inappropriate data leakage by data holders downstream in the data-release supply-chain, we propose a design of regulated efficient/bounded inefficient economic mechanisms for oligopoly data trading markets using a novel preference function bidding approach on a simplified sellers-broker market. Our methodology preserves the heterogeneous privacy preservation constraints (at a grouped consumer, i.e., app, level) upto certain compromise levels, and at the same time satisfies information demand (via the broker) of agencies (e.g., advertising organizations) that collect client data for the purpose of targeted behavioral advertising.
