论文标题
拜占庭最终的一致性和点对点数据库的基本限制
Byzantine Eventual Consistency and the Fundamental Limits of Peer-to-Peer Databases
论文作者
论文摘要
Sybil攻击是许多对等数据库系统的关注，其中大量对手控制的节点加入了网络，因此需要昂贵的对策，例如工作证明。但是，有一类数据库应用程序可以通过设计对Sybil攻击免疫，因为它们可以忍受任意数量的拜占庭可控节点。在本文中，我们使用称为拜占庭最终一致性（BEC）的一致性模型来表征此类应用程序。我们介绍了一种算法，该算法确保基于拜占庭因果广播的BEC，证明其正确性，并在原型实施中表现出近乎最佳的性能。
Sybil attacks, in which a large number of adversary-controlled nodes join a network, are a concern for many peer-to-peer database systems, necessitating expensive countermeasures such as proof-of-work. However, there is a category of database applications that are, by design, immune to Sybil attacks because they can tolerate arbitrary numbers of Byzantine-faulty nodes. In this paper, we characterize this category of applications using a consistency model we call Byzantine Eventual Consistency (BEC). We introduce an algorithm that guarantees BEC based on Byzantine causal broadcast, prove its correctness, and demonstrate near-optimal performance in a prototype implementation.
