论文标题
介导的说服力
Mediated Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究发件人之间的战略信息设计游戏，他选择了与国家相关的信息结构，一个可以从这些结构中生成的信号的调解员，以及在观察前两个玩家产生的信号后采取行动的接收者。我们表征了足够的信息启示条件，比较有或没有调解人的结果，并就发件人和调解员的偏好提供了比较静态。我们还提供了有关发件人可以诱导的一系列可行后验信仰集的新颖概念和计算见解，并使用这些结果来获得有关平衡结果的见解。发件人永远不会从调解中受益，而接收器可能会受益。令人惊讶的是，当调解员的偏好与她的偏好不完全保持时，接收器受益；相反，调解员应该更喜欢更多的信息启示，而不是发件人，但不仅仅是完美的启示。
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. We characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, compare outcomes with and without a mediator and provide comparative statics with regard to the preferences of the sender and the mediator. We also provide novel conceptual and computational insights about the set of feasible posterior beliefs that the sender can induce, and use these results to obtain insights about equilibrium outcomes. The sender never benefits from mediation, while the receiver might. Strikingly, the receiver benefits when the mediator's preferences are not perfectly aligned with hers; rather the mediator should prefer more information revelation than the sender, but less than perfect revelation.
