论文标题
出售两个相同的物体
Selling Two Identical Objects
论文作者
论文摘要
众所周知，在多维类型空间中的最佳（即最大化）销售机制可能涉及随机化。我们获得确定性机制最佳的条件，可将两个相同的，不可分割的物体出售给单个买家。我们分析了两个设置：（i）降低边际值（DMV）和（ii）增加边缘值（IMV）。因此，买方对两个单位的价值不是独立的。 我们表明，在分布的众所周知的条件下（由于McAfee和McMillan（1988）），（a）在DMV模型中确定性地出售第一个单元是最佳选择，并且（b）在IMV模型中对捆绑包（这是确定性机制）是最佳的。在分布的足够条件下，确定性机制在DMV模型中是最佳的。 我们的结果适用于当必须出售两个对象的指定顺序时，我们的结果适用于异质对象。
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent. We show that under a well-known condition on distributions~(due to McAfee and McMillan (1988)), (a) it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically in the DMV model and (b) it is optimal to bundle (which is a deterministic mechanism) in the IMV model. Under a stronger sufficient condition on distributions, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model. Our results apply to heterogeneous objects when there is a specified sequence in which the two objects must be sold.
