论文标题
犯罪汇总，威慑和见证信誉
Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一个模型，即犯罪的均衡频率以及证人报告的信息，当潜在罪犯可以犯下多种罪行，而证人则受到报复风险和特殊报告偏好的约束。我们比较了在法律奖学金中讨论的多种指控的两种方式：（i）被定罪是基于被告犯下至少一种未指定的犯罪的可能性，并造成严厉的惩罚，潜在的罪犯在证人的私人信息中引起负相关，而这些信息会导致信息的报告，信息的信息，信息聚集失败，以及频繁的犯罪和频率的攻击和频率的攻击。此外，在定罪的情况下降低惩罚可以改善威慑和证人报告的信息。 （ii）当指控分别治疗以裁定有罪和定罪会受到严厉的惩罚时，证人报告是有信息的，罪行很少见。
We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subject to retaliation risk and idiosyncratic reporting preferences. We compare two ways of handling multiple accusations discussed in legal scholarship: (i) When convictions are based on the probability that the defendant committed at least one, unspecified offense and entail a severe punishment, potential offenders induce negative correlation in witnesses' private information, which leads to uninformative reports, information aggregation failures, and frequent offenses in equilibrium. Moreover, lowering the punishment in case of conviction can improve deterrence and the informativeness of witnesses' reports. (ii) When accusations are treated separately to adjudicate guilt and conviction entails a severe punishment, witness reports are highly informative and offenses are infrequent in equilibrium.
