论文标题
外部选项的策略防止分配
Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
论文作者
论文摘要
防止策略机制广泛用于市场设计中。在一个抽象的分配框架中，代理可以使用外部选项，我们为策略机制获得了两个结果。它们为不同模型中的几个现有结果提供了统一的基础，并在某些模型中暗示了新的结果。第一个结果证明，对于单独的理性和防止策略机制，固定每个代理商选择外部选项的可能性等同于固定机制。第二个结果为两个可能的分配数量是有限的，可以使两种防策略机制等效地等效。
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for several existing results in distinct models and imply new results in some models. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down every agent's probability of choosing his outside option is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result provides a sufficient condition for two strategy-proof mechanisms to be equivalent when the number of possible allocations is finite.
