论文标题
在GPS欺骗攻击下的PMU数据完整性：稀疏错误校正框架
On PMU Data Integrity under GPS Spoofing Attacks: A Sparse Error Correction Framework
论文作者
论文摘要
考虑到GPS欺骗攻击，请考虑减轻对相量测量单元（PMU）数据完整性的影响的问题。我们提出了一个稀疏的误差校正框架，以治疗由于GPS欺骗攻击而可能损坏的PMU测量结果。我们利用了GPS欺骗攻击的稀疏性质，即只有一小部分PMU受到攻击的影响。我们首先介绍攻击性可识别性条件（就网络拓扑，PMU位置和欺骗PMU的数量而言），在该条件下，可以通过欺骗攻击来确定数据操作。可识别性条件对PMU的位置如何影响其对GPS欺骗攻击的韧性具有重要意义。为了有效纠正欺骗的PMU数据，我们提出了一种稀疏的误差校正方法，其中计算任务被分解为较小的区域以确保可伸缩性。我们介绍了从IEEE RTS-96和IEEE 300测试网络获得的数值模拟获得的实验结果，以证明所提出的方法的有效性。
Consider the problem of mitigating the impact on data integrity of phasor measurement units (PMUs) given a GPS spoofing attack. We present a sparse error correction framework to treat PMU measurements that are potentially corrupted due to a GPS spoofing attack. We exploit the sparse nature of a GPS spoofing attack, which is that only a small fraction of PMUs are affected by the attack. We first present attack identifiability conditions (in terms of network topology, PMU locations, and the number of spoofed PMUs) under which data manipulation by the spoofing attack is identifiable. The identifiability conditions have important implications on how the locations of PMUs affect their resilience to GPS spoofing attacks. To effectively correct spoofed PMU data, we present a sparse error correction approach wherein computation tasks are decomposed into smaller zones to ensure scalability. We present experimental results obtained from numerical simulations with the IEEE RTS-96 and IEEE 300 test networks to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
