论文标题
定价小组会员资格
Pricing group membership
论文作者
论文摘要
我们认为代理商在“类型”上有所不同的模型决定了他们对公共物品的自愿贡献。我们分析了群体的平衡组成在集中式和集中式选择下。我们表明存在一个自上而下的分类平衡，即存在一组价格的平衡，这会导致可以按类型级别订购的团体，而该组的第一批K类型为价格最高，等等。这既存在于分散的和集中的选择。我们还以内源性组的规模分析模型，并检查在自上而下的社会上分类的情况下。我们说明何时集成（即混合类型，以便每个组的平均类型相同）在社会上比自上而下的分类更好。最后，我们表明，即使小组之间的竞争，自上而下的排序也是有效的。
We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by level of types, with the first k types in the group with the highest price and so on. This exists both under decentralized and centralized choosing. We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially efficient. We illustrate when integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even when groups compete among themselves.
