论文标题
通过私人监控发出信号
Signaling with Private Monitoring
论文作者
论文摘要
当知情方不观察其行为产生的信号时，我们研究动态信号传导。一位长期的球员随着时间的流逝，她的类型不断地表明她的近视第二名球员私下监视她的行为。反过来，近视运动员通过他的行动不完美的公共信号传递了他的私人推论。偏好是线性二次的，信息结构是高斯。我们使用信念状态构建线性马尔可夫平衡，直到长期播放器的$ \ textit {二阶信念} $。由于进行了私人监控，因此该状态是长期玩家过去的比赛的明确功能。然后，通过这个二阶信仰渠道出现了一种新颖的分离效应，改变了信仰是公开时产生的传统信号。检查领导，声誉和交易模型的应用。
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic player transmits his private inferences back through an imperfect public signal of his actions. Preferences are linear-quadratic and the information structure is Gaussian. We construct linear Markov equilibria using belief states up to the long-run player's $\textit{second-order belief}$. Because of the private monitoring, this state is an explicit function of the long-run player's past play. A novel separation effect then emerges through this second-order belief channel, altering the traditional signaling that arises when beliefs are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined.
