论文标题
具有主动入侵者的离散事件系统的不透明度
Opacity of Discrete Event Systems with Active Intruder
论文作者
论文摘要
不透明度是一种安全属性,将系统泄漏到外部观察者(即入侵者)正式泄漏。在离散事件系统(DES)文献中已经研究的常规不透明度通常假设被动入侵者,他们仅观察系统的行为。但是,在许多网络安全问题中,例如Web服务,活跃的入侵者,能够影响系统的行为以外的被动观察,需要考虑和捍卫。因此,我们有动力扩展不透明度的概念来处理活跃的入侵者。为此,我们将系统建模为非确定性的有限状态传感器。假定入侵者对系统结构有充分的了解,并且能够通过注入不同的输入和观察其响应来与系统进行交互。在此设置中,我们首先引入反应性电流状态不透明度(RCSO)概念,该概念表征了系统不会泄漏其秘密状态的属性,而不管入侵者如何操纵系统行为。此外,我们将此概念扩展到基于语言和初始状态的反应性不透明概念,并研究它们之间的关系。事实证明,所有提出的反应性不透明度概念等效于RCSO。因此,我们专注于RCSO并研究其验证问题。结果表明,可以通过构造观察者自动机来验证RCSO。
Opacity is a security property formalizing the information leakage of a system to an external observer, namely intruder. The conventional opacity that has been studied in the Discrete Event System (DES) literature usually assumes passive intruders, who only observe the behavior of the system. However, in many cybersecurity concerns, such as web service, active intruders, who are capable of influencing the system's behavior beyond passive observations, need to be considered and defended against. We are therefore motivated to extend the opacity notions to handle active intruders. For this, we model the system as a non-deterministic finite-state transducer. It is assumed that the intruder has a full knowledge of the system structure and is capable of interacting with the system by injecting different inputs and observing its responses. In this setup, we first introduce reactive current-state opacity (RCSO) notion characterizing a property that the system does not leak its secret state regardless of how the intruder manipulates the system behavior. We furthermore extend this notion to language-based and initial-state reactive opacity notions, and study the relationship among them. It turns out that all the proposed reactive opacity notions are equivalent to RCSO. We therefore focus on RCSO and study its verification problem. It is shown that the RCSO can be verified by constructing an observer automaton.