论文标题
可点点加密：可授权完全键合的通用结构
Puncturable Encryption: A Generic Construction from Delegatable Fully Key-Homomorphic Encryption
论文作者
论文摘要
Green和Miers在IEEE S＆P 2015提出的点点加密（PE）是一种公共密钥加密，允许接收者通过反复更新解密键而无需与发件人进行通信，从而撤销单个消息。 PE是构建许多有趣应用程序的重要工具，例如异步消息传递系统，前向零往返时间协议，公钥水印方案和前向代理重新加密。本文从观察结果中重新审视了PES，即可以将刺穿属性作为有效计算功能实现。从这种角度来看，我们提出了一种通用的PE结构，该PE结构是通过Boneh等人的密钥委托机制（DFKHE）增强的。在2014年的Eurocrypt。我们表明，我们的PE构建享有所选的明文攻击（可以将其转换为自适应安全性，并有一定效率损失）的选择性安全性）。基于框架，我们获得了基于错误问题的学习后的第一个Quantum后安全性PE实例化，在标准模型中选择的明文攻击（CPA）下选择性安全。我们还讨论了修改我们的框架的能力，以支持Brakerski和Vaikuntanathan在Crypto 2016上启发的无限数量的密文标签。
Puncturable encryption (PE), proposed by Green and Miers at IEEE S&P 2015, is a kind of public key encryption that allows recipients to revoke individual messages by repeatedly updating decryption keys without communicating with senders. PE is an essential tool for constructing many interesting applications, such as asynchronous messaging systems, forward-secret zero round-trip time protocols, public-key watermarking schemes and forward-secret proxy re-encryptions. This paper revisits PEs from the observation that the puncturing property can be implemented as efficiently computable functions. From this view, we propose a generic PE construction from the fully key-homomorphic encryption, augmented with a key delegation mechanism (DFKHE) from Boneh et al. at Eurocrypt 2014. We show that our PE construction enjoys the selective security under chosen plaintext attacks (that can be converted into the adaptive security with some efficiency loss) from that of DFKHE in the standard model. Basing on the framework, we obtain the first post-quantum secure PE instantiation that is based on the learning with errors problem, selective secure under chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model. We also discuss about the ability of modification our framework to support the unbounded number of ciphertext tags inspired from the work of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan at CRYPTO 2016.
