论文标题
发挥混合动作的声誉：特征定理
Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem
论文作者
论文摘要
患者玩家私下观察了一种持续的状态，该状态直接影响其近视对手的回报，并且可以成为每个时期都采取相同混合行动的几种承诺类型之一。我表征了一系列环境，无论他的阶段游戏回报功能如何，患者玩家至少在所有均衡中都获得了承诺的回报。由于相互依存的价值，患者玩家无法通过模仿混合策略承诺类型来保证他的混合承诺收益，而对纯粹承诺行动的小扰动可以显着降低患者球员的保证平衡收益。
A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of environments under which the patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff function. Due to interdependent values, the patient player cannot guarantee his mixed commitment payoff by imitating the mixed-strategy commitment type, and small perturbations to a pure commitment action can significantly reduce the patient player's guaranteed equilibrium payoff.
