论文标题
团队卑鄙的野外比赛
Teamwise Mean Field Competitions
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了许多团队中基于等级的奖励。在每个相当大的团队中，我们都会考虑一个平均场地贡献游戏，每个团队成员都会为普通Poisson项目过程的跳跃强度做出贡献。在所有团队中，平均野外比赛游戏是根据完成时间的排名，即Poisson项目流程的跳跃时间，并且根据其排名，对每个团队的奖励。在团队竞争游戏的层面上，当团队规模由以下确定时，引入了三个优化问题：（i）团队经理； （ii）中央规划师； （iii）团队成员作为合伙企业的投票。我们为每个团队成员提供一个相对的性能标准，以分享团队的奖励，并制定一些平均野外游戏的平均野外游戏案例，这是文献的新手。在所有均质参数的问题中，可以以明确的方式计算每个工人的平衡控制以及平衡或最佳团队规模，从而使我们能够分析研究某些模型参数的影响并讨论其经济影响。还提供了两个数值示例，以说明不同团队规模决策之间的参数依赖性和比较。
This paper studies competitions with rank-based reward among a large number of teams. Within each sizable team, we consider a mean-field contribution game in which each team member contributes to the jump intensity of a common Poisson project process; across all teams, a mean field competition game is formulated on the rank of the completion time, namely the jump time of Poisson project process, and the reward to each team is paid based on its ranking. On the layer of teamwise competition game, three optimization problems are introduced when the team size is determined by: (i) the team manager; (ii) the central planner; (iii) the team members' voting as partnership. We propose a relative performance criteria for each team member to share the team's reward and formulate some special cases of mean field games of mean field games, which are new to the literature. In all problems with homogeneous parameters, the equilibrium control of each worker and the equilibrium or optimal team size can be computed in an explicit manner, allowing us to analytically examine the impacts of some model parameters and discuss their economic implications. Two numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the parameter dependence and comparison between different team size decision making.
