论文标题
用于电力系统电压稳定性的Stackelberg安全投资游戏
A Stackelberg Security Investment Game for Voltage Stability of Power Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在攻击者和电力系统的防守者之间制定了stackelberg游戏。攻击者试图秘密和聪明地改变电源系统的负载设定点，以便减小网格的电压稳定余量，从而驱动整个系统降低电压塌陷。辩护人或系统操作员旨在通过打开控制装置（例如分流电容器库）来重新调整反应性电源来弥补这种减少。提出了一种修改后的向后感应方法，以找到游戏的基于成本的Stackelberg平衡（CBSE），从而节省了玩家的成本，同时在预算和秘密限制下提供了两个玩家的投资资源的最佳分配。我们为IEEE 9-BUS Power System模型对提出的游戏进行了广泛的分析，并为IEEE 39-BUS Power System模型提供了一个示例。已经证明，除非其安全预算远低于攻击者的预算，否则辩护人能够保持系统稳定性。
We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is reduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse. The defender, or the system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning the reactive power injection to the grid by switching on control devices, such as a bank of shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is proposed to find a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) of the game, which saves the players' costs while providing the optimal allocation of both players' investment resources under budget and covertness constraints. We analyze the proposed game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and present an example of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus power system model. It is demonstrated that the defender is able to maintain system stability unless its security budget is much lower than the attacker's budget.
