论文标题

对联邦元学习的后门攻击

Backdoor Attacks on Federated Meta-Learning

论文作者

Chen, Chien-Lun, Golubchik, Leana, Paolieri, Marco

论文摘要

联合学习允许多个用户在保留数据隐私的同时协作培训共享的分类模型。这种方法是由中央服务器汇总的模型更新,被证明容易受到中毒后门攻击的影响:恶意用户可以更改共享模型以任意从给定类中分类特定输入。在本文中,我们分析了后门攻击对联合元学习的影响,在该元学习中,用户可以仅使用几个示例来训练一个模型,该模型可以适应不同的输出类。虽然原则上可以使联合学习框架更加强大(当新的训练示例是良性的情况下),但我们发现,即使是1次攻击也可以非常成功,并且经过额外的培训后,我们仍然会坚持不懈。为了解决这些漏洞,我们提出了一种受匹配网络启发的防御机制,从其功能的相似性和支持标记的示例的支持集可以预测输入的类别。通过从与联邦共享的模型中删除决策逻辑,后门攻击的成功和持久性大大减少了。

Federated learning allows multiple users to collaboratively train a shared classification model while preserving data privacy. This approach, where model updates are aggregated by a central server, was shown to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks: a malicious user can alter the shared model to arbitrarily classify specific inputs from a given class. In this paper, we analyze the effects of backdoor attacks on federated meta-learning, where users train a model that can be adapted to different sets of output classes using only a few examples. While the ability to adapt could, in principle, make federated learning frameworks more robust to backdoor attacks (when new training examples are benign), we find that even 1-shot~attacks can be very successful and persist after additional training. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose a defense mechanism inspired by matching networks, where the class of an input is predicted from the similarity of its features with a support set of labeled examples. By removing the decision logic from the model shared with the federation, success and persistence of backdoor attacks are greatly reduced.

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