论文标题
两订单顺序多单元拍卖
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了对相同商品的两种序列第二价格（或一价）拍卖中的平衡。买家的增量值较弱，我们做出了一个行为无效的假设：买家不会超过其增量值。从结构上讲，我们表明的平衡与贪婪的招标策略本质上相关。然后，我们证明了三个结果。首先，任何平衡都包括三个阶段：一个竞争阶段，竞争减少阶段和单季阶段。特别是，有一段时间，一个买家表现出单声镜行为。其次，价格异常的下降是：在无价值游戏中的任何均衡时，价格随着时间的流逝而弱下降，这一事实以前以超额量的平衡而闻名。第三，连续拍卖的无政府状态价格正好为$ 1-1/e $。
We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their incremental values. Structurally, we show equilibria are intrinsically linked to a greedy bidding strategy. We then prove three results. First, any equilibrium consists of three phases: a competitive phase, a competition reduction phase and a monopsony phase. In particular, there is a time after which one buyer exhibits monopsonistic behaviours. Second, the declining price anomaly holds: prices weakly decrease over time at any equilibrium in the no-overbidding game, a fact previously known for equilibria with overbidding. Third, the price of anarchy of the sequential auction is exactly $1 - 1/e$.
