论文标题
在贝叶斯说服中收获信息盈余
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
贝叶斯说服模型研究了知情的发件人与接收者之间的沟通，并强调了发件人从他的信息优势中提取最大盈余的能力。在本文中，我们研究了一个带有多个发件人的设置，但是接收器仅与他选择的一个发件人进行交互：发件人可以使用信号和接收器，然后在临时阶段选择与发送者进行交互。我们的主要结果是，每当发件人甚至对彼此的喜好有些不确定时，接收者就会在此游戏的所有均衡中都会收到所有信息盈余。
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we study a setting with multiple senders, but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim stage, with which sender to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are even slightly uncertain about each other's preferences, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria of this game.
