论文标题
SEQL：安全扫描锁定以进行IP保护
SeqL: Secure Scan-Locking for IP Protection
论文作者
论文摘要
已知现有的逻辑锁定攻击成功地解密了锁定组合电路的功能上的键。通过选择性初始化组合逻辑并分析响应，可以通过扫描链扩展这些攻击到基于现实世界中的智力智力（IPS，是顺序电路）。在本文中，我们提出了SEQL，该SEQL可以实现功能隔离并锁定选择性flip-flop功能输入/扫描输出对，从而使解密的密钥在功能上不正确。我们对扫描锁定问题进行了正式研究，并证明了在任何给定的IP上自动化我们提出的防御。我们表明，Seql隐藏了攻击者的功能纠正键，从而增加了解密密钥在功能上不正确的可能性。当在管道的组合基准测试（ISCAS，MCNC），顺序基准（ITC）和成熟的RISC-V CPU时，SEQL具有100％的韧性，可抵御广泛的最先进攻击，包括SAT [1]，包括Dip Dip [2]，Double-Dip [2]，Hacktest [3]，Smt [3]，Smt [4]，fall [4]，fall [4]，5]攻击[7]。
Existing logic-locking attacks are known to successfully decrypt functionally correct key of a locked combinational circuit. It is possible to extend these attacks to real-world Silicon-based Intellectual Properties (IPs, which are sequential circuits) through scan-chains by selectively initializing the combinational logic and analyzing the responses. In this paper, we propose SeqL, which achieves functional isolation and locks selective flip-flop functional-input/scan-output pairs, thus rendering the decrypted key functionally incorrect. We conduct a formal study of the scan-locking problem and demonstrate automating our proposed defense on any given IP. We show that SeqL hides functionally correct keys from the attacker, thereby increasing the likelihood of the decrypted key being functionally incorrect. When tested on pipelined combinational benchmarks (ISCAS,MCNC), sequential benchmarks (ITC) and a fully-fledged RISC-V CPU, SeqL gave 100% resilience to a broad range of state-of-the-art attacks including SAT[1], Double-DIP[2], HackTest[3], SMT[4], FALL[5], Shift-and-Leak[6] and Multi-cycle attacks[7].
