论文标题
在竞争性社会中自我诱导的阶级分层：嫉妒的纳什稳定性
Self induced class stratification in competitive societies of agents: Nash stability in the presence of envy
论文作者
论文摘要
嫉妒是比较奖励的倾向，当竞争社会产生回报差异的不平等现象时，可以期望展开。结果表明，增加的嫉妒水平不可避免地导致自我诱导的分离为较低和上层阶级。班级分层是纳什稳定且严格的，同一班级的成员获得相同的奖励。上层阶级代理人独家纯粹的策略，所有下层阶级的代理人都采用相同的混合策略。上层阶级代理的分数随着较大的嫉妒而逐渐减少，直到留下单个上层药物。介绍了基本参考模型（购物故障模型）的数值模拟和完整的分析处理。阶级分层的社会的特性是普遍的，只有通过潜在的效用函数可以间接控制，这意味着阶级分层社会在本质上对政治控制具有抗药性。讨论了对人类社会的影响。可以指出的是，当社会变得越来越有竞争力时，嫉妒的影响就会得到扩大。
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of payoff differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict, with members of the same class receiving identical rewards. Upper class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper class agents decreases progressively with larger levels of envy, until a single upper class agent is left. Numerical simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a basic reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. The properties of the class-stratified society are universal and only indirectly controllable through the underlying utility function, which implies that class stratified societies are intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications for human societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the repercussions of envy are amplified when societies become increasingly competitive.
