论文标题
争夺：用于构建逻辑加密的状态，连通性和路由增强模型
SCRAMBLE: The State, Connectivity and Routing Augmentation Model for Building Logic Encryption
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们引入了争夺，作为一个新型的逻辑锁定解决方案，用于顺序电路，而访问扫描链的访问受到限制。该争夺可用于通过将其状态过渡图（STG）隐藏在大量键控制的错误过渡中来锁定FSM。此外，它可以通过隐藏大量键对照的错误连接中的时序路径的连通性来锁定顺序电路（顺序数据索）。此外，争夺的结构使我们能够通过隐藏了大量键控制的假序列中的正确扫描链序列来将该方案作为一种新的扫描链锁定解决方案参与。我们证明，所提出的方案均与（1）对FSM的2级攻击以及（2）与展开以及有限模型检查集成在一起的SAT攻击。我们已经讨论了两个争夺的变体：（i）连接性争夺（Cramble-c）和（b）逻辑争夺（cramble-l）。 Cramble-C依赖于使用近块对数开关网络构建的卫星硬牌和钥匙控制模块。 Cramble-L使用输入多路复用技术将FSM的一部分隐藏在内存中。在结果部分中，我们描述了每种变体对最新攻击的有效性。
In this paper, we introduce SCRAMBLE, as a novel logic locking solution for sequential circuits while the access to the scan chain is restricted. The SCRAMBLE could be used to lock an FSM by hiding its state transition graph (STG) among a large number of key-controlled false transitions. Also, it could be used to lock sequential circuits (sequential datapath) by hiding the timing paths' connectivity among a large number of key-controlled false connections. Besides, the structure of SCRAMBLE allows us to engage this scheme as a new scan chain locking solution by hiding the correct scan chain sequence among a large number of the key-controlled false sequences. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme resists against both (1) the 2-stage attacks on FSM, and (2) SAT attacks integrated with unrolling as well as bounded-model-checking. We have discussed two variants of SCRAMBLE: (I) Connectivity SCRAMBLE (SCRAMBLE-C), and (b) Logic SCRAMBLE (SCRAMBLE-L). The SCRAMBLE-C relies on the SAT-hard and key-controlled modules that are built using near non-blocking logarithmic switching networks. The SCRAMBLE-L uses input multiplexing techniques to hide a part of the FSM in a memory. In the result section, we describe the effectiveness of each variant against state-of-the-art attacks.
