论文标题
安全协议以保护距离计算中的位置隐私
Secure protocol to protect location privacy in distance calculation
论文作者
论文摘要
几种应用需要不同人之间的计算距离。例如，如果我们想在人类流行病和流行病的情况下或法官施加限制令时，这是必需的。但是，定期揭示的位置可能会对参与方构成隐私威胁。连续的位置数据可用于推断所有者的个人信息，例如行为，宗教信仰，购买习惯，例程等。在本文中，我们表明可以计算两个当事方之间的距离而不披露其纬度和经度数据。为此，我们根据Elgamal密码系统及其同构属性设计了一个安全协议。提出的协议允许在保留位置隐私的同时计算距离。根据安全性和性能对协议进行分析。安全分析表明，没有任何涉及方可以学习有关位置的任何信息。
Several applications require computing distances between different people. For example,this is required if we want to obtain the close contacts of people in case of and epidemic,or when restraining orders are imposed by a judge. However, periodically revealing location might pose a privacy threat to the involved parties. Continuous location data may be used to infer personal information about the owner, like behaviors, religious beliefs, buying habits, routines, etc. In this paper, we show that it is possible to calculate distance between two parties without disclosing their latitude and longitude data. For this purpose, we design a secure protocol based on the ElGamal cryptosystem and its homomorphic properties. The proposed protocol allows the calculation of distances while preserving location privacy. The protocol is analyzed in terms of security and performance. The security analysis shows that no involved party can learn any information about location.
