论文标题
频率调制的硬件特洛伊木马
Hardware Trojan with Frequency Modulation
论文作者
论文摘要
通过插入硬件特洛伊木马，使用第三方IP内核在FPGA中实施应用程序的威胁。为了解决这一威胁，重要的是要预测硬件特洛伊木马的构建方式并确定其弱点。本文介绍了一个用于实施强大硬件木马的逻辑系列，该家族可以逃避两种主要的检测方法，即未使用的电路识别和侧向通道分析。通过以频率而不是振幅编码信息来实现这种鲁棒性，以便在“正常”操作期间，特洛伊扳机电路的状态永远不会保持恒定。此外，使用拟议的逻辑家族构建的特洛伊木马电路的功耗可以通过最少的设计工作和补充硬件资源来掩盖。描述了针对具有频率调制的硬件木马的防御措施。
The use of third-party IP cores in implementing applications in FPGAs has given rise to the threat of malicious alterations through the insertion of hardware Trojans. To address this threat, it is important to predict the way hardware Trojans are built and to identify their weaknesses. This paper describes a logic family for implementing robust hardware Trojans, which can evade the two major detection methods, namely unused-circuit identification and side-channel analysis. This robustness is achieved by encoding information in frequency rather than amplitude so that the Trojan trigger circuitry's state will never stay constant during 'normal' operation. In addition, the power consumption of Trojan circuits built using the proposed logic family can be concealed with minimal design effort and supplementary hardware resources. Defense measures against hardware Trojans with frequency modulation are described.
