论文标题
关于智能电网和合作云提供商的协调
On Coordination of Smart Grid and Cooperative Cloud Providers
论文作者
论文摘要
以云联合会形式的合作云提供商可以通过利用各种位置的电价波动来降低其能源成本。一方面，在这种环境下，电价对形成的联合会产生了重大影响，因此，云提供商所获得的利润，另一方面，云合作对智能电网的性能不可避免地影响。在这方面，独立的云提供商和智能电网之间的互动被建模为两阶段的Stackelberg游戏，与本文中的联盟游戏交织在一起。在这个游戏中，在第一阶段，智能电网，作为领导者选择了适当的电价机制来最大化自己的利润。在第二阶段，云提供商合作管理其工作量，以最大程度地降低电力成本。鉴于云提供商在联邦形成过程中的动态，智能电网已使用基于约束马尔可夫决策过程（CMDP）的优化模型来实现最佳策略。数值结果表明，与非合作计划相比，拟议的解决方案平均得出的智能电网平均收益约为28％和29％，云提供商的利润分别为云提供商。
Cooperative cloud providers in the form of cloud federations can potentially reduce their energy costs by exploiting electricity price fluctuations across different locations. In this environment, on the one hand, the electricity price has a significant influence on the federations formed, and, thus, on the profit earned by the cloud providers, and on the other hand, the cloud cooperation has an inevitable impact on the performance of the smart grid. In this regard, the interaction between independent cloud providers and the smart grid is modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game interleaved with a coalitional game in this paper. In this game, in the first stage the smart grid, as a leader chooses a proper electricity pricing mechanism to maximize its own profit. In the second stage, cloud providers cooperatively manage their workload to minimize their electricity costs. Given the dynamic of cloud providers in the federation formation process, an optimization model based on a constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) has been used by the smart grid to achieve the optimal policy. Numerical results show that the proposed solution yields around 28% and 29% profit improvement on average for the smart grid, and the cloud providers, respectively, compared to the noncooperative scheme
