论文标题
改善了欧盟委员会投票规则维度的下限
Improved lower bound on the dimension of the EU council's voting rules
论文作者
论文摘要
Kurz and Napel（2015）证明，欧盟委员会的投票系统（基于2014年人口数据）不能表示为六个加权游戏的交集，即，其维度至少为7个。这为现实世界中的投票规则创造了新的记录，而作者则提出了确切的确定性。最近，Chen，Cheung和Ng（2019）表明该维度最多为24。 我们提供了第一个改进的下限，并表明尺寸至少为8。
Kurz and Napel (2015) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen, Cheung, and Ng (2019) showed that the dimension is at most 24. We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least 8.
