论文标题
在网络中的捉迷藏游戏
A game of hide and seek in networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出并研究了隐藏在网络中的战略模型，网络设计师在该网络中选择了链接及其在面对搜索者的网络中的位置，该网络面临着检查和破坏网络的搜索者。我们表征了Hider的最佳网络，以及对这些网络的平衡隐藏和寻求策略。我们表明，最佳网络要么等于周期或核心 - 外围网络的变体，在该网络中，周围的每个节点都连接到核心中的一个节点。
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.
